

Long-Term and Pension Savings

The Real Return

2020 Edition



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Pension Savings: The Real Return

2020 Edition

A Research Report by BETTER FINANCE

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Acronyms

AIF	Alternative Investment Fund
AMC	Annual Management Charges
AuM	Assets under Management
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
Bln	Billion
BPETR	'Barclay's Pan-European High Yield Total Return' Index
CAC 40	'Cotation Assistée en Continu 40' Index
CMU	Capital Markets Union
DAX 30	'Deutsche Aktieindex 30' Index
DB	Defined Benefit plan
DC	Defined Contribution plan
DE	Germany
DG	Directorate General of the Commission of the European Union
DK	Denmark
DWP	United Kingdom's Governmental Agency Department for Work and Pensions
EBA	European Banking Authority
EE	Estonia
EEE	Exempt-Exempt-Exempt Regime
EET	Exempt-Exempt-Tax Regime
ETF	Exchange-Traded Fund
EIOPA	European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
ES	Spain
ESAs	European Supervisory Authorities
ESMA	European Securities and Markets Authority
EU	European Union
EURIBOR	Euro InterBank Offered Rate
EX	Executive Summary
FR	France
FSMA	Financial Services and Market Authority (Belgium)
FSUG	Financial Services Users Group - European Commission's Expert Group
FTSE 100	The Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index
FW	Foreword
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HICP	Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices
IBEX 35	Índice Bursátil Español 35 Index
IKZE	'Indywidualne konto zabezpieczenia emerytalnego' – Polish specific Individual pension savings account
IRA	United States specific Individual Retirement Account



IT	Italy
JPM	J&P Morgan Indices
KIID	Key Investor Information Document
LV	Latvia
NAV	Net Asset Value
Mln	Million
MSCI	Morgan Stanley Capital International Indices
NL	Netherlands
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OFT	United Kingdom's Office for Fair Trading
PAYG	Pay-As-You-Go Principle
PIP	Italian specific 'Individual Investment Plan'
PL	Poland
PRIIP(s)	Packaged Retail and Insurance-Based Investment Products
RO	Romania
S&P	Standard & Poor Indexes
SE	Sweden
SK	Slovakia
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
SPIVA	Standard & Poor Dow Jones' Indices Research Report on Active Management
Scorecard	performances
TEE	Tax-Exempt-Exempt Regime
TCR/TER	Total Cost Ratio/ Total Expense Ratio
UCITS	Undertakings for the Collective Investment of Transferable Securities
UK	United Kingdom



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Country Case: Germany

Zusammenfassung

Das deutsche Rentensystem gehört zu jenen, in denen das System der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung (Säule I) eine relativ wichtige Rolle für das Alterseinkommen der deutschen Rentner spielt. Die Bruttorentenersatzrate aus dem obligatorischen öffentlichen System beträgt 38,7% des individuellen Einkommens (gegenüber durchschnittlich 36,6% im Durchschnitt der OCED-Länder), während die Ersatzrate aus freiwilligen Systemen (Säule II und Säule III zusammen) 13,5% beträgt. Die Riester- und Rürup-Reformen von 2002 und 2005 zielten auf eine stärkere Beteiligung deutscher Arbeitnehmer an betrieblichen und individuellen Altersversorgungssystemen ab, da die akkumulierten Ansprüche relativ gering waren.

Summary

The German pension system is among those where the mandatory public scheme (Pillar I) plays a relatively important role in German retirees' old-age income. The gross pension replacement rate from mandatory public scheme is equal to 38.7%¹⁸¹ of individual earnings (against 39.6% on average in OCED countries), while the replacement rate from voluntary schemes (Pillar II and Pillar III together) is 13.5%. With a relatively low level of accumulated entitlements, the *Riester reform (in 2002)* and the *Rürup reform (in 2005)* were aimed at increasing participation in occupational and individual pension schemes for German workers.

¹⁸¹ OECD (2019), *Pensions at a Glance 2019: OECD and G20 Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/b6d3dcfc-en>



Introduction

In 2007, the German government raised the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67. A transitional phase to attain the retirement age of 67 for individuals with less than 45 years of contributions was started in 2012, including a gradual increase of the working life of one month per year until 2029. For individuals with 45 years of contributions, the pension age had been lowered to 63 years in July 2014 but started to increase again in 2016 until it will reach 65 in 2028. The average effective age of labour market exit was about 64.6 years for men in 2017 and 64 for women¹⁸².

The German pension system can be divided into three pillars:

- Pillar I: Mandatory State Pension Insurance
- Pillar II: Voluntary Occupational Pensions
- Pillar III: Voluntary Personal Pensions

The first pillar with the statutory and the civil servant pension system is mandatory for all employees and civil servants. Currently, the general pay-as-you-go (PAYG) earnings-related first pillar statutory pension scheme covers about 85% of the employed German population whereas the public civil servants scheme protects 5%.

In 2018, the gross pension replacement rate¹⁸³ for average-wage workers from the mandatory public scheme (38.7%) was below the OECD average (39.6%). Increasing life expectancy and fewer children being born represents a challenging demographic shift in Europe, forcing younger generations to assure an adequate retirement income through private savings.

In the early 2000s, the German government executed an important pension reform to promote private pension savings through subsidies and tax incentives, as well as social security contribution savings in the case of occupational pension plans. In 2002, company pension plans (Pillar II) traditionally provided on a voluntary basis by employers, were transformed into an employee's right to have a part of its earnings paid into a company pension plan under a deferred compensation arrangement. That same year, *The Riester Reform* was introduced to boost personal pension savings, followed by *The Rürup* pension in 2005 to further complement personal pension plans.

¹⁸² BMAS (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) - Pension Projections Exercise 2018 - For the attention of the Economic Policy Committees' Working Group on Ageing Populations and Sustainability, November 2017
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economy-finance/2018-ageing-report-economic-and-budgetary-projections-eu-member-states-2016-2070_en

¹⁸³ OECD (2019), *Pensions at a Glance 2019: OECD and G20 Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris,
<https://doi.org/10.1787/b6d3dcfc-en>



Table DE1. Introductory Table - Pension System Overview

Pillar I	Pillar II	Pillar III
Mandatory State Pension Insurance:	Voluntary Occupational Pensions:	Voluntary Personal Pensions:
all persons subject to social security charges contributed 18.7% of their gross income to the scheme	employees have the right to a deferred compensation arrangement - employers the right to choose the scheme Occupational retirement schemes that can be divided into two sub-pillars: 1) direct pension promise - 2) external occupational pension schemes	supplement to the statutory pension insurance Riester pension or Rürup pension or life insurance
Mandatory for all employees who are subject to social insurance contributions	Voluntary or by tariff agreement	Voluntary
PAYG	DB and hybrid	DC
Quick facts		
Coverage (active population): 90%	About half of today's retirees receive income from a private pension	
Gross replacement rate: 38.2%	Gross replacement rate: 12.7%	
	Membership: 20.09 million	16.6 million <i>Riester</i> contracts

Source: BETTER FINANCE own composition

In the table below we present the annualized real net rates of return for retirement provision vehicles in Germany.

Aggregate summary annualised return table [1] - After charges, inflation and before tax					
		A.O.P.P.**	Riester	Rürup	Other pension insurances
1 year	2019	n.a.	0.67%	0.67%	0.72%
	2018	0.18%	0.56%	0.58%	0.60%
	2017	1.70%	0.68%	0.52%	1.06%
3 years	2017 - 2019	n.a.	0.68%	0.69%	0.74%
	2016 - 2018	1.47%	0.77%	0.79%	0.84%
	2015 - 2017	1.99%	1.32%	1.16%	1.75%
7 years	2013 - 2019	n.a.	1.53%	1.54%	1.59%
	2012 - 2018	2.48%	1.65%	1.67%	1.71%
	2011 - 2017	2.07%	1.59%	1.40%	2.07%
10 years	2010 - 2019	n.a.	1.58%	1.59%	1.62%
	2009 - 2018	2.47%	1.72%	1.73%	1.86%
	2008 - 2017	2.01%	1.84%	1.45%	2.34%
Whole reporting period*		2.24%	1.43%	1.45%	2.07%

*maximum available in this report; **A.O.P.P. stands for autonomous occupational pension plans (Table DE7); (1) Riester pension insurances contracts. Acquisition charges are included and spread over 5 years; (2) Classic pension insurance products or life insurance products. Acquisition charges are included and spread over 5 years; [1] after tax returns

Pension Vehicles



Private pensions are divided into Voluntary Occupational Pensions and Voluntary Personal Pensions. About half of today's retirees receive income from a private pension, however the proportion, currently at 16% (8% from occupational pension and 8% from personal pension) of a retiree's gross income, is currently rather low¹⁸⁴.

In general, there are no taxes on dividends, income or capital gains to take into account during the accumulation phase of the real return calculations. However, the calculations are considerably complicated by the fact that EET and TEE taxation formulas (or intermixtures) can still be found depending on the effective date of the pension promise and the type of vehicle. Consequently, the after-tax calculations are simplified and exclusively simulated as deferred taxation for the occupational *Pensionskassen* and pension funds, as well as personal *Riester* and *Rürup* insurance contracts. For that reason, the average retiree income tax rate is estimated from customised data provided by the German Federal Ministry of Finance for the year of 2012 - the most recent information available¹⁸⁵ - and set at 18%.

The classic pension insurance is not subject to deferred taxation but is (partially) taxed during the capital accumulation phase (see Taxation chapter). Furthermore, performance data is available for a longer time span, so the results cannot be directly compared to *Riester* and *Rürup* insurance contracts.

Voluntary Occupational Pensions

For a long time, occupational pension plans have typically been provided by employers on a voluntary basis. Since January 2002, however, employees have the right to occupational pensions through deferred compensation. This means that future salary or special payments, such as vocational benefits or salary increases for up to 4% of a variable contribution cap¹⁸⁶, can be converted to entitlements to a pension - if not regulated differently by a labour agreement. While employers have to comply with the demand for occupational pensions and execute them, they can choose when it comes to structuring the retirement provision, leaving little to no choice to beneficiaries. There are five types¹⁸⁷ of occupational retirement schemes that can be divided into two sub-pillars:

- one direct pension promise (book reserves); and
- four external types of occupational pension schemes (support funds, direct insurance, *Pensionskassen* and pension funds).

To some extent, the five different financing methods compete with each other, but it is also possible to combine two or more types. Both employers' and employee's contributions to occupational pensions are voluntary, however employers have to at least offer a direct insurance pension scheme so that


¹⁸⁴ Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2016).

¹⁸⁵ Data on income tax for a given year can only be completed three years later and is subsequently reprocessed by State Statistical Offices. The data also includes joint tax assessments.

¹⁸⁶ "*Beitragsbemessungsgrenze*"; there are differences between "West" and "Ost" due to the difference of the general level of salaries, but the variable contribution cap is always 4%. The "*Beitragsbemessungsgrenze Ost*" will gradually be aligned from 2018 until 2025.

¹⁸⁷ The aba (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V., German Association for Occupational Pensions) - Occupational Pension Landscape in Germany – January 2015

<https://www.aba-online.de/en/docs/attachments/42616471-6d26-4abc-a4de-5aa328b5fc8c/20150121-Occupational-Pension-Landscape-in-Germany.pdf>



employees may benefit from tax advantages (deferred taxation) and social security contribution savings if they choose to contribute. When there is a binding labour agreement, occupational pensions are generally organised for whole industrial sectors and there is no employee's right to demand divergent occupational pension provisions. Many collective agreements also oblige employers to participate financially in occupational pensions and withdraw the employer's right to choose the retirement scheme. Indeed, employer-funded pensions represent the largest share of occupational schemes, though an increasing number of deferred compensation arrangements can be found. If the occupational pension is structured as a deferred compensation and contributions are subsequently exempt from taxation and social security contributions, this will in turn lower claims from the statutory pension insurance.

Occupational pensions in Germany are managed as defined benefit (DB) plans, either as traditional or hybrid ones that can take the form of contribution-oriented DB plans with an annual minimum return guarantee, or as contribution-oriented DB plans with a minimum guarantee of the sum of nominal contributions at the retirement. The German labour law requires employers to guarantee employee's given pension promises. All occupational pensions also have to cover at least one biometric risk, such as longevity, disability or death¹⁸⁸.

Book reserves (“Direktzusage”)

Book reserves are direct pension provisions that the employer realises on the company's balance sheet in order to pay an occupational pension once the employee reaches the retirement age. In recent years, an increasing number of employers' resorts to external funding of the provisions through Contractual Trust Arrangements (CTAs). The legislator obliges to protect claims from book reserves through the “Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein” (PSVaG) in the case of an employer's insolvency. Reserves via CTAs are protected from creditors in the case of insolvency through legal independency. Book reserves are usually designed as pure benefits given by employers, though deferred compensation arrangements are generally also possible. If an employee leaves the company, there is no possibility to continue the retirement provision through private funding, though deferred benefits are maintained. Book reserves are the most widely used type of occupational pension plans in terms of assets under management.

Support funds (“Unterstützungskasse”)

Support funds, one of the oldest forms of occupational pension schemes, are institutions funded by one or several companies to provide retirement provisions for employees. The latter have no direct legal claim to benefits from support funds, only from their employers. Support funds invest the deposited funds to pay a company pension at a later date. If there is not enough money in the support fund to meet retirement commitments, employers have to compensate for the difference. The “Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein” (PSVaG) protects employee's benefits in the case of an employer's insolvency.

Direct insurance (“Direktversicherung”)

These types of occupational pensions are life insurance contracts that an employer enters into with an insurance company for its employees. Only last-mentioned or surviving dependents have claims to

¹⁸⁸ <http://www.aba-online.de/glossar.html> (Accessed on 14 June 2017).



benefits from direct insurances. The insurance contracts can be continued with personal contributions if the employee leaves the company or, under specific conditions, be transferred to a new employer. If an employee solely contributes to a direct insurance, exemptions from taxation and social security contributions can be granted¹⁸⁹ or, alternatively, the employee can make use of the *Riester* support if the contributions are made from individually taxed income.

Regulated by the German occupational pension law, both the individual transfer of occupational pension claims and the application of the *Riester* support under above-mentioned prerequisite also apply to *Pensionskassen* and pension funds.

“Pensionskassen”

Pensionskassen are institutions, formed by one or several companies, which take the form of special life insurance companies. They are legal entities that continue to pay benefits even in the case of an employer's insolvency and are supervised by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (“*Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht*”; BaFin). In contrast with direct insurances, employees become direct insurees and often even members of the *Pensionskasse*. The traditional form (“*regulierte*”) of *Pensionskassen* offers classic life annuity contracts that may invest a maximum of 35% of the capital in equity. They are allowed to implement divergent actuarial interest rates and even to change the applicable mortality table. The new (“*deregulierte*”) *Pensionskassen*, in place since 2006, must act as life insurers with guaranteed interest rates and specific calculation standards.

Pension funds (“Pensionsfonds”)

Pension funds were introduced on 1 January 2002 as a new type of occupational retirement scheme. They are legal entities that grant employees a legal right to pension benefits. In contrast to *Pensionskassen* and direct insurances, pension funds are not subject to quantitative investment rules, hence their risk is generally higher. Pension funds are supervised by the BaFin, and entitlements of members and beneficiaries are protected by the PSVaG in case of insolvency of the sponsoring employer. Retirement payments can be fulfilled as lifelong annuities but there is also the possibility to have a lump-sum pay-out at the beginning of the retirement phase.

Overall, the growth of entitlements to occupational pension plans mainly took place between 2001 and 2005 and has lost momentum in recent years. Since 2005, entitlements only increased for direct insurances, *Pensionskassen* and pension funds raising the absolute number to about 15 million. It should be noted that an individual can have several entitlements, lowering the number of effectively concerned employees. Surveys of the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs have shown that individuals are often poorly informed about their occupational pension provision¹⁹⁰.

¹⁸⁹ For direct insurance, *Pensionskassen* and pension funds: 4% of the contribution cap “*Beitragsbemessungsgrenze West*” (BBVG-RV West) + €1,800 are tax exempt; 4% of the BBVG-RV West are exempt from social security contributions.

¹⁹⁰ Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2016).



Table DE2. Entitlements to active occupational pensions (in millions)

	2001	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2016	2017
Book reserves and support funds	3.9	4	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.8
Direct insurance	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.7	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.3
Pension funds	-	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
<i>Pensionskassen</i>	1.4	3.2	4.1	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.7
Total	9.5	11.5	13	13.5	13.6	14.3	14.9	15	15.1	15.2

Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2016), GDV, own calculation; data for 2018 not yet available

The *Riester* support is rarely used within the framework of occupational pension schemes. It is registered in only 1-2% of cases¹⁹¹.

While pure defined contribution (DC) plans cannot be found in Germany to date, a law introducing DC pension plans without guarantees, set up by collective bargaining agreements, passed legislation in the summer of 2017. This so-called “*Betriebsrentenstärkungsgesetz*” likewise allows for auto-enrolment of employees in a pension plan with voluntary opting-out within a specified time frame and incorporates measures to strengthen occupational pensions for low income workers through e.g. allowances and tax incentives.¹⁹²

According to a proposal submitted to the Bundesrat by the ministers of the Land of Hesse in April 2018, employees not covered by a professional scheme would automatically be affiliated to an individual pension scheme created by the government.

Voluntary Personal Pensions

Over the last few years, the German government has undertaken significant communication efforts to advertise personal provisions for old age to supplement the statutory pension insurance. Since 2002, *Riester* pension savings are being promoted by the government through two different channels: subsidies and taxation reliefs. In 2005, the *Rürup* pension was introduced to specifically support the self-employed through tax exemptions.

Riester pensions

*Riester*¹⁹³ products are formally certified personal pension plans with the objective of building up a funded retirement pension supplement. They are subject to deferred taxation, and subscribers receive subsidies from the German state. The amount received depends on personally invested contributions. Subsidies are at their maximum if the total contributions to a *Riester* product (that is, personally invested contributions plus subsidies) reach at least 4% of the individual’s previous year’s income, up to a maximum of €2,100. The subsidies add up to €175 per adult (according to the pension law of summer 2017), plus €300 for each child born since 2008 and €185 for those born before 2008. Subscribers that are younger than 25 receive a bonus of up to €200 at the moment of subscription to a *Riester* product. The minimum contribution to receive the full subsidies is €60 per year. If the calculated minimum contribution for a low-income earner is less than €60, this minimum contribution of 60 euros

¹⁹¹ Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2012).

¹⁹² <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/112/1811286.pdf> (Accessed on 14 June 2017).

¹⁹³ Named after former Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs: Walter Riester.



must always be paid in order to receive full support. If an individual pays less than his or her minimum contribution (4% of the individual's previous year's income - maximum €2,100 - , less any subsidies due, but at least €60 per year), his or her subsidies are reduced proportionately..

Though rarely used in this context, the *Riester* support is also applicable to occupational pension plans for the following three types: direct insurances, *Pensionskassen* and pension funds. *Riester* subsidies and tax allowances are personal and can only be passed on to a spouse's *Riester* contract in the case of death.

Riester pension benefits can be paid out starting at the age of 62, or at the age of 60 for contracts concluded before 2012. The subscriber obtains the right to convert the invested capital into a life annuity, or a programmed withdrawal where up to 30% of the accumulated savings can be paid out as a lump-sum. Furthermore, one fifth of the accumulated savings is reserved for life annuities starting at the age of 85.¹⁹⁴

The following types of investments are eligible as *Riester* products:

- Bank savings plan ("*Banksparplan*"): These contracts are typical long-term bank savings plans with fixed or variable interest rates.
- Pension insurance contract ("*Rentenversicherung*"): These *Riester* plans, offered by insurance companies, exist in two forms. There are typical pension insurance contracts consisting of guaranteed returns and a participation in profits. Additionally, there are also hybrid contracts where a fraction of the retirement savings is invested in investment funds. They consist of both a guaranteed part and a unit-linked part that depends on the performance of the investment funds.
- Investment fund savings plan ("*Fondssparplan*"): Savings are unit-linked, invested into investment funds chosen by the subscriber from a pool of funds proposed by a financial intermediary. The intermediary has to at least guarantee that the invested money plus the state's subsidies are available at the moment of retirement. In the case of premature withdrawals, a loss of capital is possible.
- Home loan and savings contract ("*Wohn-Riester/Eigenheimrente*"): These contracts take the form of real estate savings agreements. This most recent type of *Riester* scheme is based on the notion that rent-free housing at old age is a sort of individual retirement provision comparable to regular monetary payments.

At the end of 2019, 16.5 million *Riester* contracts had been subscribed. After steady increases in the early periods following its establishment, considerably fewer pension insurance contract contracts have been subscribed since 2012. The number of open contracts remained stable since 2015 and even decreased slightly in 2018 (-0.04%) and 2019 (-0.43%). Suggested explanations include the current environment of low interest rates along with less favourable media coverage of *Riester* products - reinforcing a general mistrust and doubt¹⁹⁵ concerning funded retirement savings. It should be noted that an individual can subscribe to several *Riester* contracts at the same time, so a direct inference of the number of individuals possessing a *Riester* contract is not possible. However, State subsidies

¹⁹⁴ Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2014).

¹⁹⁵ Evidence of this can be found in Hagen, Kleinlein (2012).



(allocations and income tax reliefs) are only possible for up to 4% of the individual gross income (maximum €2,100 per year). In fact, a small number of non-subsidised *Riester* contracts exist. This is independent from the fact that many *Riester* policy holders "forget" to ask for state subsidies, and that others do not get the complete allocations. About two-thirds of *Riester* contracts take the form of pension insurance contracts, making it by far the most important type of *Riester* investment despite a decrease of subscriptions observed since 2015. Only the number of investment fund savings plans and home loan agreements continued to increase over the past four years, the latter also thanks to a booming real estate market in a low interest environment. According to Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, more than one fifth of the *Riester* contracts are currently put on hold - meaning that savers are suspending their contributions.¹⁹⁶

Table DE3. Number of *Riester* contracts (in thousands)

	Pension insurance contracts	Bank savings plan	Investment fund savings plan	Home loan and savings contract	Total
2001	1,400	N/A	N/A		1,400
2002	2,998	150	174		3,322
2003	3,451	197	241		3,889
2004	3,557	213	316		4,086
2005	4,524	260	574		5,358
2006	6,388	351	1,231		7,970
2007	8,194	480	1,922		10,596
2008	9,285	554	2,386	22	12,247
2009	9,995	634	2,629	197	13,455
2010	10,484	703	2,815	460	14,462
2011	10,998	750	2,953	724	15,425
2012	11,023	781	2,989	953	15,746
2013	11,013	805	3,027	1,154	15,999
2014	11,030	814	3,071	1,377	16,292
2015	10,996	804	3,125	1,564	16,489
2016	10,931	774	3,174	1,691	16,570
2017	10,881	726	3,233	1,767	16,607
2018	10,827	676	3,288	1,810	16,601
2019	10,772	627	3,313	1,818	16,530
2020Q1	10,744	617	3,307	1,811	16,479

Rürup Pensions

Introduced in 2005, the *Rürup*¹⁹⁷ pension (or "*Basisrente*") is the most recent form of pension provision and, next to occupational pension plans and *Riester* pension plans, the third type of private pension that is supported by the German state through tax exemptions. The *Rürup* pension actually has similar characteristics to the statutory pension insurance. Contributions are utilised for monthly life annuities, starting with the retirement phase at the age of 62 (or at the age of 60 for contracts concluded before 2012), and there is no possibility of lump-sum payments. The benefits are personal, thus non-transferable, and cannot be disposed or capitalised either. Contributions are exempt from taxation up to a high deduction cap. *Rürup* pensions, specifically designed for self-employed persons and

¹⁹⁶ <http://www.bmas.de/DE/Themen/Rente/Zusaetzliche-Altersvorsorge/statistik-zusaetzliche-altersvorsorge.html>. (data extracted on 12 July 2020)

¹⁹⁷ Named after German economist Bert Rürup.



freelancers who could not benefit from state supported pension savings before its establishment, are beneficial for those with higher revenues because of the high tax-exempt savings amount. They take the form of pension insurance contracts that are, in contrast with *Riester*, irredeemable, for which invested funds cannot be regained before the retirement phase. It is also possible to subscribe to *Rürup* insurance contracts that invest in investment funds through savings plans. Such contracts can be designed with or without capital guarantees¹⁹⁸.

Life insurance and pension insurance contracts

Retirement provision in Germany is also carried out through classic pension insurance products or life insurance products, possibly the ones that are unit-linked. However, if not certified within the framework of the *Riester* pension, the *Rürup* pension or as an occupational pension plan, these contracts do not benefit from initial tax deductions or allowances. Nonetheless, they do play an important role in personal retirement provisions with about 71 million contracts concluded at the end of 2018¹⁹⁹. These contracts are of a diverse nature. They usually start paying out at the moment of retirement, though there are also contracts that pay immediately after conclusion ("*Sofortrente*"). It is possible to redeem both via lump-sums and annuities.

While the pension law of summer 2017 mainly aimed at strengthening occupational pensions, personal pensions are likewise impacted as the basic allowances for *Riester* contracts increased from €154 to €175 from early 2018.

Charges

Information on the multifaceted types of charges for private pension products are rather hard to obtain and often non-transparent for individuals, which complicates the decision-making process.

Within Pillar II, due to the DB character of pension schemes, employers have an interest in cost-efficient pension provision, and the competition among different financing methods creates pressure on costs. In the case of book reserves and support funds, an employer has to meet the specified retirement commitments agreed upon, thus charges will not be discussed within the scope of these two types of occupational pension.

One of the main advantages of occupational pension schemes is that charges are usually lower than for personal pension plans because they are spread over larger groups. Employers often receive quantity discounts or customised rates with lower administrative charges. This is especially the case if rates are defined for whole industry sectors.

The following operating expenses data for autonomous occupational pension funds (*Pensionskassen* and pension funds) are available in the OECD Pension indicators database²⁰⁰ and are provided by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Charges are expressed as a percentage of the funds' total assets. We did not find any charges data shown separately for occupational direct insurances. We

¹⁹⁸http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Steuern/Weitere_Steuerthemen/Produktinformationsblatt/2016-12-12-Produktinformationsblatt-Basisrente.html

¹⁹⁹ <https://www.gdv.de/de/zahlen-und-fakten/versicherungsbereiche/renten--und-kapitalversicherungen-24038>

²⁰⁰ <http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/globalpensionstatistics.htm> (data extracted on 12 July 2020)



did not find any data on acquisition costs which are opaque in the case of occupational schemes and even prohibited by law for traditional *Pensionskassen*.

Operating expenses comprise all costs arising from the general administration of the plan/fund that are treated as plan/fund expenses (i.e. investment management costs and administrative costs):

- Investment expenses shall comprise all costs arising from investment management, such as: internal investment personnel costs; investment management fees (paid to external asset managers); trading expenses; legal fees (investment management related); custodian, accounting and performance measurement fees; property maintenance costs; asset consultant fees; other investment expenses.
- Administrative costs shall comprise all administrative costs, such as: interest expense; actuary fees; directors/trustees fees and expenses; personnel costs (excluding investment managers); external sales agents; total fees paid to audit firm; IT expenditures; rental costs; other legal fees (excluding those related to investment management); other administrative costs.

Table DE4. Operating expenses as a % of total assets for autonomous occupational pension funds

	<u>Investment expenses</u>	<u>Administrative costs</u>	<u>Total</u>
2002	0.132	0.122	0.254
2003	0.393	0.363	0.756
2004	0.509	0.471	0.980
2005	0.304	0.281	0.585
2006	0.222	0.205	0.427
2007	0.163	0.151	0.314
2008	0.144	0.133	0.277
2009	0.139	0.119	0.258
2010	0.128	0.110	0.238
2011	0.118	0.101	0.219
2012	0.118	0.093	0.211
2013	0.114	0.094	0.208
2014	0.111	0.086	0.197
2015	0.122	0.088	0.210
2016	0.111	0.083	0.194
2017	0.108	0.077	0.185
2018	0.112	0.077	0.189

Source: OECD data



Table DE5. Life insurance expense ratios

	Acquisition charges (as % of total premiums for new policies)	Administrative charges (as % of investments)
2000	5.6	0.40
2001	5.5	0.39
2002	5.4	0.38
2003	5	0.37
2004	4.5	0.35
2005	5.6	0.35
2006	4.9	0.33
2007	5.2	0.31
2008	4.9	0.30
2009	5.2	0.29
2010	5.1	0.27
2011	5	0.25
2012	5	0.25
2013	5.1	0.24
2014	5	0.23
2015	4.9	0.22
2016	4.8	0.21
2017	4.7	0.20
2018	4.6	0.20
2019	4.4	0.19

Source: GDV.de


Charges for *Riester* products are often the topic of negative media coverage. It is frequently stated that the charges consume almost all of the state's subsidies. Especially challenging for individuals is the complicated cost structure and the lack of transparency of *Riester* contracts. For instance, there are internal costs, like acquisition costs, distribution costs and administrative costs, that are derived from differing and sometimes ambiguous determination bases, as well as external costs if parts are invested into investment funds. Recently, charges on capital withdrawals in the retirement phase have been at the centre of criticism. This opacity has created a curious situation where even providers with favourable charges are unable to properly set themselves apart from those more expensive ones. From a legal standpoint, until 2016, the German legislator only dictated that acquisition costs of *Riester* products had to be spread over at least 5 years to alleviate the initial cost burden.

Calculations by the German government in the early 2000s estimated the total charges to be 10% of the yearly savings premium, and this has become the standard for *Riester* charges calculations ever since²⁰¹. Our own research shows that estimations of total charges of, on average, 10% to 12% of the yearly savings premium can be assumed. However, one can observe an enormous cost span from 2.5% to 20% for insurance contracts²⁰².

With regard to the less-used *Rürup* contracts and their shorter history, information is even harder to obtain. For a long time, there has been very little transparency regarding the cost structure, as there was no obligation by law for detailed disclosures. In contrast to *Riester* products, there is no obligation

²⁰¹ Rürup-Kommission (2003).

²⁰² Gasche, Bucher-Koenen, Haupt, Angstmann (2013).



to spread the initial acquisition and distribution charges over a defined period²⁰³, but application of the same conditions as for *Riester* products is common. The total charges for *Rürup* pensions expressed as percentages of the yearly savings premium are estimated by practitioners to be a little lower than for *Riester* pensions. Other personal retirement provisions, such as classic pension insurance and life insurance contracts, are likewise often stated to have slightly lower total charges than *Riester* products.

Since 1 January 2017, in order to increase transparency and comparability, every consumer receives corresponding product information sheets before the subscription to a *Riester* or *Rürup* contract. These information sheets are standardised and contain, along with details of individual charges, actual costs illustrating a reduction in yield ratio which should allow for a better comparison among products of the same risk type. Also enforced from this date are charges arising from changes by *Riester* or *Rürup* providers for contracts after 1 January 2017, now subject to hard caps such as distribution cost application to only 50% of the transferred subsidised capital²⁰⁴.

Average effective costs are not available for the periods under review within this study, hence for our calculations we only consider two types of charges at our disposal: acquisition and administrative charges. For the years 2016 and 2017, *Assekurata*²⁰⁵ calculated average effective costs of about 0.8%²⁰⁶ per year, which would lead to a heavier charge burden than what our calculations can capture.

Taxation

A reorganisation of retirement savings taxation has been instructed by a Federal Constitutional Court decision from 2002. This revision came into effect in 2005 whereupon taxation is based on a model that divides the different forms of retirement savings according to three groups.

The statutory pension insurance and the *Rürup* pension belong to the first group. Funded pension schemes like occupational pensions and the *Riester* pension belong to the second group. The third group covers the standard pension insurance or life insurance products due to their likewise existent function as investment products.

Contributions to products from the third group always have to be paid from taxed income. The products from the first two groups are subject to deferred taxation. Contributions up to a deduction cap are exempt from taxation and generally subject to tax in its entirety during the pay-out phase.

While products from the second group have already been partially subject to deferred taxation before 2005, this has not been the case for products from the first group. A transitional phase towards complete deferred taxation started in 2005 and since then, every year, higher amounts of contributions

²⁰³ ZEW (2010).

²⁰⁴ <http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Monatsberichte/2013/07/Inhalte/Kapitel-3-Analysen/3-4-die-gefoerderte-private-altersvorsorge.html> (Accessed on 17 July 2018).

²⁰⁵ "ASSEKURATA Assekuranz Rating-Agentur GmbH" (www.assekurata.de) is a private company specialized in the quality assessment of insurance companies from a customer's perspective providing rating and analysis services. For instance, ASSEKURATA is the only rating agency incorporating policy holder's opinions on their insurers gathered from customer surveys directly into their verdicts. ASSEKURATA, as a licensed European rating agency, is supervised by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). Calculations by Assekurata are renowned and utilised by governmental, corporate and consumer structures.

²⁰⁶ Assekurata (2017).



can be deducted from taxation and consequently the amount of retirement pay-outs subject to taxation rises. In 2025, pension savings for up to €20,000 for individual insurees and €40,000 for spouses will be exempt from initial taxation. 60% of the maximal amount was tax deductible in 2005 which means the percentage rises 2% each year until the maximum is attained in 2025. The 50% contribution by employers is already tax exempt, so in 2016, 32% of an employee's total contributions to retirement savings were tax exempt.

The percentage of retirement pay-outs subject to taxation was 50% in 2005. Since then, for each year following, the percentage of retirement pay-outs subject to taxation for new retirees rises at a rate of 2%. This means that in 2020, new retirees will pay taxes on 80% of their retirement pay-outs. From 2020 onwards, the rate will rise at 1% annually and consequently retirees from 2040 onwards will have to pay full taxes on their retirement pay-outs²⁰⁷.

Voluntary Occupational Pensions

For occupational pension plans in 2013, and for commitments starting from 2005 on, the following taxation rules apply for the individual types of occupational pension schemes:

Book reserves and support funds

Book reserve and support fund contributions through deferred compensation are fully tax exempt while up to 4% of a variable contribution cap is exempt from social security contributions. Benefits are taxed as income at the personal rate.

Direct insurances, Pensionskassen and pension funds

Direct insurances, *Pensionskassen* and pension funds are treated identically according to taxation legislation. In 2017, contributions through deferred compensation were tax exempt for up to €4,848 (4% of the 2017 contribution cap, €1,800) and exempt from social security contributions for up to €3,048 (4% of the 2017 contribution cap)²⁰⁸. Investment income is tax exempt while benefits are subject to taxation.

Voluntary Personal Pensions

Riester pensions

Since 2008, total contributions to a *Riester* product of at most €2,100 are exempt from initial taxation even if this amount is more than 4% of the previous year's income. An automatic review by fiscal authorities within the framework of the income tax statement assures further fiscal relief on the difference originating if the tax deductions exceed the state's subsidies. During the savings accumulation period, investment income is likewise tax exempt, while benefits are taxed in the retirement phase but exempt from social security contributions.

²⁰⁷ Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2017).

²⁰⁸ If the limits have not already been reached by employers' contributions.



Rürup pensions

Contributions to *Rürup* pensions will be exempt from taxation for up to €20,000 per adult in the year of 2025. In the year of 2005, 60% of this ceiling was exempt from taxation and during a transitional phase, the percentage rises at a rate of 2% each year.

Table DE6. Tax exemptions for <i>Rürup</i> contributions							
Year of contribution	2005	...	2016	...	2020	...	2025
Tax deductible	60%	...	82%	...	90%	...	100%

Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2016)

Table DE7. Taxation of <i>Rürup</i> benefits							
Year of benefit	2005	...	2016	...	2020	...	2040
Tax deductible	50%	...	72%	...	80%	...	100%

Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2016)

Benefits from *Rürup* pensions are taxed in the retirement phase at the personal income tax rate. In 2005, 50% of the benefits were subject to deferred taxation. Until the year 2020, the taxable part of each year increases at 2%. From then on, the proportion will increase by 1% each year until finally, from the year 2040 on, benefits will be fully taxed²⁰⁹.

Life insurance and pension insurance contracts

Other retirement savings products that are not particularly promoted by the German state are taxed as follows for all contracts subscribed to since 1 January 2005:

Contributions are no longer tax deductible as special expenses and have to be made from taxed income. Benefits are taxed at the personal income tax rate on corresponding earnings (the difference between contributions and total pay-outs) in the retirement phase. Furthermore, one has to differentiate whether the insurance benefit is carried out as a one-time lump-sum payment or if a lifetime annuity payment is chosen. In the case of lump-sum pay-outs, if the contract runs for at least 12 years and the insuree is older than 60 years, or 62 years (for contracts subscribed to after 31 December 2011), only 50% of the earnings are subject to taxation. If these conditions are not met, the full earnings are taxed. In the case of life annuities, even further tax reliefs are possible depending on the age of the first retirement pay-out, as defined in the tax table. For instance, if the retiree is 60 years old, 22% of the earnings are subject to taxation and at the age of 65 only 18%.

Pension Returns

Pension return calculations are not performed for book reserves and support funds. These are individual commitments to employees that will not increase or decrease depending on asset performances. The commitments are protected by the PSVaG, hence employees can estimate the exact amount they can expect in the retirement phase. Furthermore, we do not have data on performance or charges available for the 2nd pillar direct insurances - thus we cannot perform real return calculations for this occupational financing vehicle either.

²⁰⁹ Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2016).



These drawbacks should be kept in mind when interpreting real returns, as well as the impact of subsidies, such as allowances.

Voluntary Occupational Pensions

Pensionskassen and pension funds

The following table shows real return calculations for Pillar II aggregate *Pensionskassen* as well as pension funds supervised by BaFin.

Table DE8. Average annual rate of investment returns for autonomous occupational pension plans (in %)

	Nominal return* before administrative costs, inflation and tax	Nominal return after charges and before tax, inflation	Real return after charges and inflation and before taxes	Real return after charges and inflation and after taxes
2002	2.81	2.68	1.56	1.22
2003	4.58	4.20	3.07	2.54
2004	4.94	4.45	2.11	1.55
2005	4.89	4.60	2.42	1.84
2006	4.60	4.39	2.96	2.41
2007	4.16	4.01	0.90	0.40
2008	1.62	1.49	0.38	0.19
2009	4.76	4.64	3.73	3.15
2010	4.94	4.82	2.93	2.32
2011	3.01	2.91	0.66	0.29
2012	4.82	4.73	2.59	2.00
2013	4.29	4.20	2.94	2.41
2014	4.61	4.52	4.42	3.85
2015	3.37	3.27	3.07	2.65
2016	3.81	3.72	2.08	1.61
2017	3.76	3.68	2.16	1.70
2018	1.92	1.84	0.18	-0.05
AVG	3.93	3.77	2.24	1.76

* Nominal return after investment management costs

Source: OECD Pension Markets in Focus (2019) for Norminal Returns; OECD Pension Indicators database (Accessed on 12 July 2020) for charges; Eurostat; OEE calculation.

To simulate the impact of taxation on the real return of *Pensionskassen* and pension funds, the average income tax rate for retirees (18%) has been applied to the 70% of the pay-outs that were subject to deferred taxation in the year of 2015.

Since German pension funds and *Pensionskassen* are currently exclusively offered as DB or hybrid plans (see Pension Vehicles), employees bear minor risks when investments perform poorly²¹⁰.

²¹⁰ OECD (2016)



Voluntary Personal Pensions

Information on the performance of personal pension plans is hard to obtain and there are considerable controversies surrounding the proper estimation method, notably for *Riester* insurance contracts.

Calculations of real returns for Voluntary Personal Pensions are only executed for insurance contract types since information on returns and charges is not consistently available for other types of personal pension plans. Nonetheless, this provides an important insight into the most important part of promoted personal pension plans since about two-thirds of all *Riester* pensions are designed as pension insurance contracts, as are all *Rürup* pensions.

The following real return estimations are based on average return rates calculated by *Assekurata*. One has to keep in mind that the calculations made by *Assekurata* are based on voluntary participations. For instance, in 2019, 82 insurance companies were asked to participate in the survey representing more than 99% of the market. 54 providers responded, corresponding to 78% of the market share. This may lead to a bias based on voluntariness. The return rates provided by *Assekurata* are composed of a guaranteed interest part ("*Höchstrechnungszins*" or "*Garantiezins*"), set and capped by the German Federal Ministry of Finance, and a surplus sharing part ("*Überschussbeteiligung*")²¹¹. Furthermore, the return figures provided are related to the investment part of the gross premium which is only about 60% to 90% of the total premium depending on not only deductions of distribution and administrative charges, but also risk premium²¹².

Though already introduced in 2002, data on investment return rates has only been available since 2005 for *Riester* pensions, just like for *Rürup* pensions which were introduced that year. Return rates for classic pension insurances are available for an 18-year period. For our real return estimations, we assumed that acquisition charges are spread over five years for all insurance contract types. Consequently, the charge burden in the first five years is more severe.

²¹¹ Terminal bonuses and participation in valuation reserves are not included in these calculations as they are difficult to compare and not equally applied. Terminal bonuses are usually paid on the maturity of the policy or on death. Similarly, valuation reserves only apply to about 5% of policy holders. One has to keep in mind that they account for, on average, 20% of the total return.

²¹² In life insurers' advertisements, the return percentage figures that are published are always linked to the investment part of the premiums and, very often, the insurers do not differentiate between the gross premium and the investment part of the premium which is misleading from a consumer's perspective.



Riester pension

Table DE9. Riester pension insurances' average annual rate of investment returns (in %) - Including acquisition charges

	Nominal return before charges, inflation, tax	Nominal return after charges and before tax, inflation	Real return after charges, inflation and before tax	Real return after charges and inflation and after taxes
2005	4.24	2.83	0.69	0.33
2006	4.18	2.79	1.39	1.03
2007	4.18	2.81	-0.25	-0.62
2008	4.36	3.00	1.88	1.49
2009	4.27	2.92	2.03	1.65
2010	4.19	3.91	2.03	1.52
2011	4.05	3.79	1.52	1.03
2012	3.92	3.66	1.55	1.07
2013	3.56	3.31	2.06	1.63
2014	3.35	3.11	3.01	2.61
2015	3.11	2.88	2.68	2.30
2016	2.78	2.56	0.94	0.61
2017	2.50	2.29	0.80	0.50
2018	2.43	2.23	0.56	0.27
2019	2.41	2.22	0.67	0.39
Avg / Year	3.57	2.95	1.43	1.05

Source: Assekurata; Eurostat; GDV; OEE calculation

It is important to note though that for *Riester* products, subsidies which are not included in these calculations can play an important role in determining their performance. This is especially the case for low earners or for families with many children. Average and high earners benefit significantly from tax exemptions.



Rürup pension

Table DE10. Rürup pension's average annual rate of investment returns (in %) - Including acquisition charges

	Nominal return before charges, inflation, tax	Nominal return after charges and before tax, inflation	Real return after charges, inflation and before tax	Real return after charges and inflation and after taxes
2005	4.31	2.90	0.76	0.39
2006	4.20	2.81	1.41	1.04
2007	4.21	2.84	-0.22	-0.59
2008	4.37	3.01	1.89	1.50
2009	4.27	2.92	2.03	1.65
2010	4.21	3.93	2.05	1.54
2011	4.07	3.81	1.54	1.05
2012	3.90	3.64	1.53	1.06
2013	3.57	3.32	2.07	1.64
2014	3.36	3.12	3.02	2.61
2015	3.13	2.90	2.70	2.32
2016	2.81	2.59	0.97	0.64
2017	2.52	2.31	0.82	0.52
2018	2.45	2.25	0.58	0.29
2019	2.41	2.22	0.67	0.39
AVG	3.58	2.97	1.45	1.07

Source: Assekurata; Eurostat; GDV; OEE calculation

As discussed in the Pension Vehicles chapter, the contributions to *Rürup* pensions are, in contrast to *Riester* pensions²¹³, not guaranteed and cannot be recalled or capitalised, which can lead to the following difficulty: *Rürup* pensions were especially introduced for self-employed people and freelancers whose income may vary considerably from year to year, in particular in times of crisis. If contributions can no longer be maintained, and with contracts that are concluded lifelong, ongoing administrative charges can gradually diminish invested retirement savings. Hence, consumer advice centres²¹⁴ usually only advise *Rürup* pensions if consumers are professionally established and if the payments of contributions are secured in the long run²¹⁵.

In order to simulate after-tax real returns, the average income tax rate estimation for retirees has been applied to the 72% of the pay-outs that were subject to deferred taxation in the year of 2016.

Personal pension insurance

The classic pension insurance is not subject to deferred taxation and data is available for a longer time span so one has to be careful with the comparison of investment returns within the Pillar III. Since contributions have to be paid from taxed income, classic pension insurances are generally less favourable than *Riester* or *Rürup* pensions with regard to the tax burden. However, the complexity of

²¹³ Contributions (gross premiums) and state subsidies for all kinds of *Riester* contracts are guaranteed.

²¹⁴ Such as Verbraucherzentrale Hamburg e. V.

²¹⁵ Gasche, Bucher-Koenen, Haupt, Angstmann (2013).



taxation in all three stages (contribution phase, accumulation phase²¹⁶ and pay-out phase) could not be taken into account within this study and consequently after-tax simulations are only executed for pension products with deferred taxation schemes. The following table shows real return calculations for Pillar III pension insurance contracts.

Table DE11. Pension insurances' average annual rate of investment returns (in %) - Including acquisition charges			
	Nominal return before charges, inflation, tax	Nominal return after charges and before tax, inflation	Real return after charges, inflation and before tax
2000	7.15	5.65	3.40
2001	7.10	5.61	4.18
2002	6.12	4.66	3.51
2003	4.84	3.40	2.28
2004	4.43	3.02	0.71
2005	4.31	3.94	1.78
2006	4.24	3.90	2.48
2007	4.25	3.93	0.83
2008	4.39	4.08	2.94
2009	4.28	3.98	3.08
2010	4.20	3.92	2.04
2011	4.07	3.81	1.54
2012	3.91	3.65	1.54
2013	3.61	3.36	2.11
2014	3.40	3.16	3.06
2015	3.16	2.93	2.73
2016	2.86	2.64	1.02
2017	2.61	2.40	0.91
2018	2.47	2.27	0.60
2019	2.46	2.27	0.72
AVG	4.18	3.62	2.07

Source: Assekurata; Eurostat; GDV; OEE calculation

The very favourable nominal returns in the early 2000s raise the annual average of classic pension insurances. Return figures from 2005 on resemble those of *Riester* and *Rürup* pensions.

Conclusions

The performance of *Pensionskassen* and pension funds in real terms has been positive over the whole period from 2002-2018, with an annualised average return of 2.24% before taxation. Even the difficult years of 2007, 2008 and 2011 still recorded modest positive real returns. German Voluntary Occupational Pensions are currently exclusively offered as DB or hybrid plans but pension reforms, including the introduction of DC pension vehicles as early as January 2018, are under way. It remains to be seen if the abandonment of traditional guarantees which has already created much debate and

²¹⁶ It can be considered that the contribution and the accumulation phases in reality are the same since the beneficiary is contributing normally for the whole duration of his professional career, but for the purpose of our study we are considering money-weighted returns and therefore we distinguish between the moment when the contribution is made, the period of the investment and finally the moment when the investment is redeemed.



uncertainty among employees and providers can boost participation in occupational pensions, in particular for SMEs.

The real annualised average returns of Voluntary Personal Pensions have also delivered positive results, 1.43% for *Riester*, 1.45% for *Rürup* and 1.82% for classic pension insurances over a 15-year span. Voluntary Personal Pensions have somewhat stalled over recent years and a considerable share of subscribed *Riester* pensions is put on hold for the time being. Persistent low interest rates, as reflected in the steadily falling guaranteed interest rate (from 2.75% in 2005 to 0.9% in 2017), contribute to render new contracts of these pensions less profitable. While more and more providers already undercut these minimum return guarantees, a definite abolishment of this regulated interest fraction is still under discussion. The other important return part of pension insurances, surplus sharing, has likewise been plummeting over the last years, if nothing else to fulfil commitments of former contracts with higher guarantees. Voluntary Personal Pensions, especially the bureaucratic and expensive *Riester* pensions, continue to be at the centre of controversial debates.

Policy Recommendations

Instead of trying to introduce new forms of old-age provisions, efforts should be focused on improving the existing products. The “*Riester*” product, with its licensing process, its strict legal framework, its exclusive number of categories and its comparability, is already an existing standardised private product. Nevertheless, the contracts are often criticised for their high costs.

There is a lot of potential for reform within all three systems of old-age provision. Whereas the public pension system should be focused on its core purpose, both company and private pension schemes could be revamped by reducing excess bureaucracy, abandoning contradictory legislation and further enhancing transparency.

Proposals have been made by different stakeholders. It is up to the legislator to take them into consideration and to propel legislation to increase penetration and to make old age provision more sustainable.

The discussion on “*Riester*” should take into account the fact that more than 16 million people have concluded *Riester* contracts and trust in this form of private old-age provision. Statutory reforms should therefore retain the current *Riester* scheme. The aim should be to maintain the current *Riester*-product diversity, to open it up to all citizens and at the same time to simplify the *Riester* support and make it more transparent, easier to understand and more attractive for citizens.

An education effort should also be made to encourage people (notably young people) to save for retirement and to promote existing products. A recent survey among young people highlighted that a decreasing number of young adults save for their old age, but an increasing number supports a stronger role of government in additional pension schemes. This obvious contradiction reveals a lack of knowledge regarding the pension system, options already available and the necessity to take responsibility for oneself.



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